The concept of joint action is at the core of numerous diverse research topics, including philosophical explorations of social action, studies of human dialogue, human-computer interaction, computer-supported collaborative work, multiagent systems, distributed artificial intelligence, distributed simulation, and contract law. It is therefore remarkable that so central a concept has received so little detailed analysis, in comparison with studies of individuals. However, in recent years, the study of joint action has begun to undergo more intense scrutiny, primarily from philosophers and researchers (...) in artificial intelligence. These two disciplines often address similar topics but with different motivations, methodologies, tools, and criteria for success. Although this paper is inspired by philosophical work, it is squarely motivated by the concerns of building intelligent systems that are capable of collaborative behavior, either with a user, or with other such systems. Still, we hope that the paper sheds light on philosophical issues, and treats the subject of joint action at a sufficiently precise level to be illuminating of problems that any philosophical account needs to confront. (shrink)

This paper describes an approach for reasoning in a dynamic domain with nondeterministic actions in which an agent’s beliefs correspond to the simplest, or most plausible, course of events consistent with the agent’s observations and beliefs. The account is based on an epistemic extension of the situation calculus, a first-order theory of reasoning about action that accommodates sensing actions. In particular, the account is based on a qualitative theory of nondeterminism. Our position is that for commonsense reasoning, the world is (...) most usefully regarded as deterministic, and that nondeterminism is an epistemic phenomenon, arising from an agent’s limited awareness and perception. The account offers several advantages: an agent has a set of categorical beliefs, yet can deal with equally-likely outcomes or with outcomes of differing plausibility. The agent maintains as its set of contingent beliefs the most plausible, or simplest, picture of the world, consistent with its beliefs and actions it believes it executed; yet it may modify these in light of later information. (shrink)

潘知常(1956- ),湖南醴陵人,南京大学中文系副教授、中华全国青年联合会委员等.

제1장 다산의 시대와 생애 정재동/17 1. 시대적 배경/18 2. 다산의 생애/21 제2장 인간관, 사회관, 국가관 최병선·조병훈/29 1. 서론/29 2. 다산이 그린 이상적 국가상과 법제도/32 3. 인간관/37 4. 사회관/43 5. 국가관/52 6. 해석과 평가/67 제3장 조직관 김성현/75 1. 서론/75 2. 주관과 객관 차원에서 다산의 조직관/77 3. 규제와 변동 차원에서 다산의 조직관/83 4. 해석과 평가/86 제4장 공직관 김성기/94 1. 서론/94 2. 다산 윤리의 기초/96 3. 다산의 공직관/113 4. 다산의 공직윤리/118 제5장 부정부패에 대한 인식 최병선·조병훈/129 1. 서론/129 2. 환곡의 문란과 부정부패의 양상/130 3. (...) 원인 분석과 처방/145 4. 해석과 평가/163 제6장 리더십 문명재·김공록/174 1. 서론/174 2. 섬김의 리더십과 변혁적 리더십/175 3. 목민 리더십의 현대적 의미/179 4. 해석과 평가/196 제7장 의사결정론 심준섭/199 1. 서론/199 2. 조선의 사법 체계/201 3. 의사결정과 결정오차에 대한 다산의 사상/204 4. 해석과 평가/220 제8장 사회복지 이념 조성한/223 1. 서론/223 2. 조선 후기의 사회복지 상황/224 3. 다산의 복지 이념/227 4. 생산적 복지의 딜레마와 다산의 교훈/241 5. 해석과 평가/245 제9장 교육관 조성한/249 1. 서론/249 2. 교육철학/250 3. 교육제도와 교육 내용/258 4. 해석과 평가/265 제10장 다산 행정사상의 현대적 해석과 평가 최병선·심준섭/267 1. 권력 중심의 현실주의적 세계관/270 2. 애민에 기초한 법제도 인식/276 3. 철두철미한 실적주의 공직관/284 4. 과학적 합리주의/289 5. 이 글을 마치며/293 용어 정리/297 찾아보기/309. (shrink)

Dans l'immense correspondance de Leibniz son échange épistolaire avec Goldbach occupe une certaine place. 4 lettres de Leibniz à Goldbach ont été publiées à son temps par Ch.G.W. Kortholt dans les deux premiers volumes de Leibnitii Epistolae ad diversos (t. I-IV, Lipsiae, 1734-1742) et rééditées par L. Dutens (Leibniz: Opera omnia, t. 3 et 5, Genevae, 1768). Récemment on a découvert 6 lettres de Goldbach à Leibniz conservées aux Archives Centrales d'Etat des Actes Anciens (= ACAA) à Moscou et encore (...) un extrait de lettre de Leibniz à Goldbach à Hannover. Cela fait, pris ensemble, une jolie collection de 11 lettres dont la traduction russe fut publiée en 1983. Nous en présentons maintenant le texte original latin avec une brève introduction et des notes. Une lettre, comme on va voir, y manque. (shrink)